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FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY:
THE POTENTIAL ORWELLIAN

IMPLICATIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF

CURRENT USES UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the classic novel 1984, George Orwell described a totalitarian society where each room had a built-in camera and where Big Brother, the
government, conducted surveillance on its citizens.' In the last few
years, face recognition technology, a computer enhanced video surveillance system, has been developed as the security method to help identify
known terrorists and criminals. 2 While this technology has the potential
to help increase security in public venues to deter criminals and to make
our lives more safe, commentators have been quick to point out that this
advance could be nothing more than the next step in implementing a
3
society not much different than that envisioned by George Orwell.
Face recognition technology has already been used upon unknowing
spectators at the 2001 Super Bowl at Tampa's Raymond James Stadium. 4 The technology has been implemented in two locations, Tampa's
Ybor City entertainment district and the hockey arena of the Salt Lake
City Winter Olympics, only to be discontinued due to ineffectiveness. Although there has never been a successful implementation of a facial recognition system, and while there has never been a terrorist or wanted
criminal arrested due to these systems, the technology continues to be a
hot topic of discussion by privacy advocates. 5
1. George Orwell, 1984 (reissue ed., New Am. Lib. Classics May 1990).
2. Bill Hammack, Face Recognition Technology: A Public Radio Commentary
1
<http://www.engineerguy.com/comm/3487.htm> (accessed Mar. 8, 2002).
3. Id. at 1 4.
4. Declan McCullagh, Call it Super Bowl Face Scan I 91 1-2 <http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,41571,00.html> (last updated Feb. 2, 200i).
5. American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, Drawing a Blank: Tampa Police Records Reveal Poor Performance of Face-Recognition Technology 912 <http'J/www.
aclu.org/news/2001/nO10302a.html> (last updated Jan. 3, 2002).
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While face recognition technology would have continued to be a hotly
debated topic in this country, emphasis on such potentially privacy evading systems changed with the tragic events of September 1 1th. 6 The terrorist plots in both New York and Washington did more than just awake
a nation as to the growing problems of terrorist states, it quickly alerted
a need for increased security in our airports, which has directly resulted
in disrupting the traditional balance between individual privacy and
public safety. With this increased need for security in domestic air
travel, airports have quickly turned to implementing face recognition
7
technology.
It remains unclear whether face recognition technology constitutes a
system which society would regard as a reasonable intrusion into their
privacy. As a technology still in its infant stages, privacy advocates are
simply left to wonder about the potential uses and future constitutional
implications of face recognition technology. No federal regulation or case
law directly on point exists to provide any guidance on how to implement
this technology in a manner that protects an individual's constitutional
rights. Thus, without such constructs to allow protection of the public,
privacy advocates will have to continue to assess the intrusiveness of
this governmental technique to protect against the potential of a Big
Brother government, similar to that described by George Orwell in
1984.8
This paper seeks to explore both the actual uses of this technology
and the constitutionality of face recognition systems under the Fourth
Amendment. In Part II of the paper, the evolution of face recognition is
discussed from the initial development of video surveillance to the recent
use of face recognition systems at the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics.
Part III concentrates on how to assess whether a technology-enhanced
government method constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment,
and thus whether such a method offends an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy. Part IV applies these constructs to the potential
uses of face recognition technology, and provides potential reasoning of
whether the method offends the traditional notions of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment. Finally, Part V concludes the paper with a discussion of the potential impact of the tragic events of September 1 1 th could
have on society's objective view of face recognition technology, whether it
6. Karen Leonard, Face Recognition Technology: Security Enhancements v. Civil
Rights 1 1 <http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/law/storg/iptf/headlines/content/2001120301.
html> (accessed Mar. 31, 2002).
7. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Facial Recognition System Considered for U.S. Airports,
Washington Post A14 (Sept. 24, 2001).
8. Nick Schoon, Caught on Camera:Digital Face Recognition 2 <http://www.count
down.org/end/big-brother_07.htm> (last updated Dec. 1999).
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could accept such methods as reasonable, and the role of advocates and
commentators in this process.
II.

THE HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF FACE
RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY

A.

INTRODUCTION TO BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY

The progeny of face recognition technology began in the banking industry with the initial development of video surveillance. 9 First introduced in 1956, video surveillance technology has grown into widespread
use in many public venues such as shopping malls, at ATM machines,
and in convenience stores. 10 With the dawn of the age of digital imaging,
these devices became more effective, less expensive, and more prevalent
throughout the country." In 1982, the City of Miami Beach implemented one of the country's first large scale deployment of video surveillance to protect its prime retail shopping district due to lack of adequate
police personnel. 12 Today, Americans are constantly subjected to video
surveillance in various forms including crime prevention, productivity
monitoring, and safety programs. 13 Over sixty urban centers in the
United States use video surveillance in public places, with Baltimore
14
boasting "the most expansive system currently in place."
As with these advancements in video surveillance, the last twenty
years has seen tremendous advances in biometric technologies. 15 "Biometrics" encompass "the techniques and methods used to identify [an]
individuals based on [his or her] physical characteristics.' 6 The technology "generally consists of four steps": (1) a "physical characteristic [or
trait] is scanned", (2) those "[unique] features are converted into a digital
code", (3) "the code is then stored in a database" or another retrievable
form, and (4) that database and digital code are accessed to identify the
individual at a later time. 17 Technologies currently utilizing biometric
9. Kanya A. Bennett, Can FacialRecognition Technology be Used to Fight the New
War Against Terrorism?: Examining the Constitutionality of Facial Recognition Surveillance Systems, 3 N.C. J.L & Tech. 151, 153 (2001).
10. Id. at 156.; Quentin Burrows, Scowl Because You're on Candid Camera:Privacy
and Video Surveillance, 31 Val. U.L. Rev. 1079, 1080 (1997).
11. Bennett, supra n. 9, at 153.
12. Burrows, supra n. 10, at 1080.
13. Id.
14. Christopher S. Milligan, Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and
Privacy, 9 S. Cal. Interdis. L.J. 295, 301 (1999).
15. John D. Woodard, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 97, 109 (1997).
16. Lisa J. McGuire, Banking on Biometrics: Your Bank's New High-Tech Method of
Identification May Mean Giving Up Your Privacy, 33 Akron L. Rev. 441, 444 (2000).
17. Id. at 445.
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identifiers include lie facial imaging, hand geometry, voice recognition,
18
and retinal scans.
The benefit of these technologies stem from their ability to accurately identify a person entering a facility through scanning their unique
physical characteristics. 19 This ability is paramount in government and
private research facilities that house highly secure items such as weap20
ons, nuclear and biohazardous materials, and top-secret information.
Also, advocates of biometric technologies hail these advances as having
numerous advantages for consumers, like reducing instances of consumer fraud, 2 1 speeding lines at airports check-in, 2 2 and deterring
criminals from entering public areas employing the technologies. 23 However, while commentators have found some benefits from these identification methods, privacy advocates such as the Electronics Privacy
Information Center and the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
have warned of the potential constitutional implications of these emerg24
ing technologies.
While face recognition technology has always been at the forefront of
these emerging biometric identification tools, both government and private research in the field has greatly accelerated over the past ten
years. 25 Over this span, both university scientists and the Department
of Defense have worked hand-and-hand to make face recognition technology a reality. 26 As the research and development agency of Department
of Justice, the National Institute of Justice since 1997 "has spent [over]
eight million dollars [in] developing face recognition technologies
through [their independent] think tank, ANSER." 27 The government's
18. Id. at 447.
19. Woodard, supra n. 15, at 97, 100.
20. Philip E. Agre, Your Face is Not a Bar Code: Arguments Against Automatic Face
Recognition in Public Places
2 <http://dlis.gseis.ucla.edu/people/pagre/bar-code.html>
(last updated Jan. 28, 2002).
21. Rachel Konrad, Airport Security Technology Under Scrutiny 6 <http://news.com/
21001001-272938.html> (Sept. 12, 2001). Currently, Walt Disney World in Orlando has
begun implementing hand recognition devices in entrances at the Orlando theme park in
order to reduce instances of individuals sharing season passes. Id.
22. Id.
23. USA Today, Tampa Puts Face-Recognition System on Public Street 1 11 <http://
www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/2001-07-13-tampa-surveillance.htm> (last updated July
13, 2001) [hereinafter Tampa Puts Face-Recognition]. In implementing face recognition
technology in the Ybor City entertainment district of Tampa, city counsel members supported the initiative asserting that the technology would deter known criminals from entering the district for fear of being identified. Id.
24. Konrad, supra n. 21, at 1 14.
25. Agre, supra n. 20, at 1.
26. Bennett, supra n. 9, at 154.
27. Julia Scheeres, Your Face-Scan Dollarsat Work 3 <http://www.wired.com/news/
technology/0,1282,46018.html> (Aug. 15, 2001). "Headed [up] by the former CIA deputy
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initial interest has been to potentially implement this technology to patrol the country's borders to reduce illegal immigration, 28 "to identify
suspects during mobile stakeouts," 29 to scan the Internet for missing
children, 30 to help search for pedophiles and purveyors of child pornogra32
phy,3 1 and the general identification of wanted criminals.

B.

How

FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY WORKS

Facial recognition technology is comprised of two important components, the video surveillance cameras used to obtain a snapshot of an
individual's face, and the computer software used to extract and analyze
that face for identification purposes. 33 Developed by Visionics of Jersey
City, N.J, the FaceIT technology used in the Ybor City District of Tampa,
employs mounted cameras used to scan crowds to extract a single human
face. 34 The Visionics "software uses a variety of pattern matching algorithms to determine if a face is" in view of the cameras. 3 5 Once detected,
the human face is extracted from its surroundings and the digitized face
is filtered to remove variations, including changes in lighting and facial
36
expression.
The program then uses this digital template to measure over eighty
nodal points that comprise an individual's face such as the distance be37
tween eyes, width of the nose, and depth of the eye sockets.
The result of this analysis is a set of numerical data called a
faceprint. 38 Note that not every nodal point can be accurately measured
based on the template acquired by the captured digital image.3 9 Thus,
the software is programmed to use between fourteen and twenty-two of
director of science and technology, Ruth David," ANSER is a fifty-year old government
think tank that develops law enforcement technology. Id.
28. Bennett, supra n. 9, at 154.
29. Scheeres, supra n. 27, at 7.
30. Id. at 6. Developed as one of the programs created by the National Institute of
Justice, the Missing Child Locator employs facial recognition technology to continually
scan the Internet for images that may potentially match with missing children. Id.
31. Id. at 11.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Q & A on FacialRecognition Technology
1-2 <http://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy/facial-recognition-faq.html> (accessed Mar. 8, 2002).
34. Tampa Puts Face-Recognition, supra n. 23, at 1.
35. Face Detection Constantly Searches for Faces in a Datastream 1 <http://www.
visionics.com/faceit/tech/detect.html> (accessed Mar. 8, 2002).
36. Id. at 2.
37. Jay Stanley & Barry Steinhardt, DrawingA Blank: The Failureof FacialRecognition Technology in Tampa, Florida
4 <http://www.aclu.orglissues/privacy/drawing-blank.pdf> (Jan. 3, 2002).
38. Bennett, supra n. 9, at 155.
39. Id. at 156.
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the measured nodal points in creating the numerical faceprint. 40 If
there are sufficient nodal measurements to create a faceprint, the computer then accesses a stored database of faceprints. Often, individual
FaceIT programs allow a human operator to assess the captured photo41
graph with the potential match found by the software.
C.

IMPLEMENTATION OF FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES

1.

The Super Bowl and Ybor City

While the use of face recognition technology has been limited in the
United States, its implementation has been tied with major sporting
events and other highly publicized uses. In January 2001, cameras were
placed throughout Raymond James Stadium by the Tampa Police Department, to scan the faces of unsuspecting Super Bowl fans. 4 2 Graphco
Technologies donated the system as an initial demonstration of the effectiveness of the face recognition technology. 4 3 Facial images acquired by
the technology were transferred to computers at a Tampa police command post in Raymond James Stadium and compared with a large
database of suspected criminals and known terrorists. 44 The technology
did successfully identify nineteen petty criminals out of almost 100,000
fans, but no arrests were actually made by Tampa police. 45 While the
Super Bowl was the first successful demonstration of face recognition
technology at a major sporting event, the use drew heavy criticism from
the ACLU, since none of the spectators attending the event were aware
46
before or during the game, that the technology had been used.
In addition to the Super Bowl, the Tampa city counsel and law enforcement officials opted to employ face recognition technology in its
Ybor City entertainment district. 47 Historically known as a high crime
area, an estimated 125,000 people visit the district every Friday. 48 On
June 29, 2001, Tampa police installed several dozen cameras along Seventh Avenue of Ybor City, using the FaceIT technology developed by Vi40. Id. at 155.
41. Id.
42. Jack Carey, ACLU Protests High-Tech Super Bowl Surveillance 2 <http://www.
usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/2001-02-02-super-bowl-surveillance.htm> (last updated Feb.
6, 2002).
43. Bennett, supra n. 9, at 157.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 158.
46. Carey, supra n. 42, at
2.
47. Robert MacMillan, Tampa Face-RecognitionVote Rattles Privacy Group - Update
1 <http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/168677.html> (Aug. 3, 2001).
48. Tampa Puts Face-Recognition, supra n. 23, at 1 1.
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sionics. 4 9 However, while the Visionics system provided fourteen
possible matches in the first few days of operation, none were actually
correct identifications. 50 In fact, two of these matches were actually of
persons of the opposite sex. 5 1 Because the system had failed to correctly
identify a single face in the Tampa police's database of criminal suspects,
the Ybor City system was officially suspended on August 11, 2001.52
2.

The Use in Airports After September 11th

Apart from Tampa, the nation's airports have increased their interest in using facial recognition technology after the events of September
11, 2001. 5 3 Soon after the devastating airline crashes in New York and
Washington, D.C., the Department of Transportation contacted Visionics
about the potential of using the FaceIT technology in our nation's airports. 54 In addition to Visionics, airport executives began looking at the
technology developed by Viisage, Inc., a technology start-up company
based out of Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT"). 5 5 The Federal Aviation Association ("FAA") soon began to test and evaluate the
different companies developing face recognition technology to assess
56
Imwhich would be the most effective to meet airport security needs.
plementing the software and systems in a major U.S. airport, such as
57
Logan International, could total almost $500,000.
In January 2002, both Fresno International Airport and St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport implemented Viisage's
FaceFINDER technology. 58 Operated by the Pinellas County Sheriffs
Office, St.-Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport checks ticketed
passengers against a database containing Federal, State, and local area
criminals. 59 Around the same time, Visionics announced that Dallas/
Fort Worth, Boston Logan, and Palm Beach International Airports
49. Stanley, supra n. 37, at 2.
50. Id. at J 14.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 11 13, 26.
53. Konrad, supra n. 21, at IT 2, 8.
54. Addie S. Ries, America's Anti-Hijacking Campaign- Will It Conform to Our Constitution?, 3 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 123, 141 (2001)
55. Gia Fenoglio, Elisabeth Frater, Sydney Freeberg, Jr., Siobhan Gorman, Erin
Heath, Louis Jacobson, Margaret Kriz, Neil Munro, Mark Murray, & Marilyn W. Serafini,
How Life Could Change, 33 Natl. J. (Sept. 22, 2001).
56. Mike Snider, Technology Offers a Feeling of Security 25 <http://www.usatoday.
com/life/cyber/tech/2001/ll115/privacy-usat.htm> (Nov. 15, 2001).
57. Fenoglio, supra n. 55.
58. Find Articles.com, St. Petersburg-Clearwater
InternationalAirport Deploys Viisage
Technology Face-RecognitionSecurity 2 <http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/mOEIN/2002_
Jan_22/82023929/print.jhtml> (Jan. 22, 2002).
59. Id. at 3.
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would begin testing of its FaceIT technology at security checkpoints. 60
Technology forecasters predict that by 2005, technology companies developing face recognition technology for use in airports will have revenues
61
approaching $1.9 billion.
3.

Use by Casinos

Besides the potential as a security measure in domestic airports,
face recognition technology has found use at various casinos, helping casino owners identify known cheats. 6 2 "When the New York- New York
Hotel & Casino opened in Las Vegas in 1997," its casino surveillance
system already included face recognition technology, which has operated
24-hours a day ever since its opening. 6 3 Soon after, the Viisage Technology was implemented in the Foxwood Casino in Connecticut, and several
other Las Vegas casinos began using the Visionics FaceIT system. 6 4 On
March 29, 2000, Viisage announced the fiftieth order and installation of
its surveillance system at a casino when it installed the system at the
Mirage Resort in Las Vegas. 6 5 Within three years, the number of Las
Vegas casinos using facial recognition systems grew from a handful to
over ninety casinos, "ranging from the small Native American owned facilities to" the more well-known hotel and casinos. 6 6 The Casino Information Network ("CIN") allows casino security operators at independent
casinos to tap into a large private biometric database of shared pictures
67
in order to identify cheats recently evicted from area casinos.
4.

The Salt Lake City Winter Olympics

Apart from the over 15,000 troops amassed by U.S. forces as security
measures for the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, face recognition tech60. DFW to Start Tests of Face-Recognition Technology, 347 Aviation Daily 6 1 (Jan.
30, 2002); see Dallas/ForthWorth to Test Face-RecognitionProduct, 19 Airports 4 1 (Jan.
29, 2002).
61. Snider, supra n. 56, at 30.
62. Fenoglio, supra n. 55.
63. Wired News, Seen City: From Surveillance cams to FacialScans, in Las Vegas the
Whole World is Watching
1, 2 <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.12/vegas-pr.
html> (Dec. 2001)
64. DesertNews.Com, Face-recognitionTechnology Raises Fears of Big Brother
24,
30 <http://www.deseretnews.com/dn/print/1,1442,150015975,00.html> (Feb. 23, 2000).
65. Tom Colatosti, Viisage Technology and Biometrica Systems Achieve 50th Face Recognition Installationat Mirage Resort, Las Vegas 1 <http://www.viisage.com/March292000.htm> (Mar. 29, 2000).
66. Paul Eng, Keying in on Faces:How FacialRecognition Software Finds Faces t 10
<http://abcnews.go.conmsections/scitech/CuttingEdge/cuttingedge0l07O6.html>
(July 6,
2001).
67. Id. at 11.
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nology was used to scan crowds for possible terrorists. 68 "Of the reported
$1.9 billion budget for the Salt Lake Games," organizers spent $310 million on security measures, including facial recognition technology. 69 At
the opening ceremonies of the games, Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") agents scanned the 52,000 spectators, cross checking them with
criminal mugshots. 70 Because of both public criticism and spiraling security costs, face recognition technology was not implemented in every
Olympic venue. 7 1 The AcSys system, developed by the AcSys Biometrics
Corporation in Burlington, Canada, was installed in two locations to prevent unauthorized access to where the Olympic medals were kept, and at
both the men's and women's hockey games. 72 However, because of concerns that the technology was not working properly, the system was shut
73
down at the Olympic Hockey venue.

D.

INTERNATIONAL USE OF FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY

The use of face recognition technology has not been limited domestically, and several countries have begun looking toward the technology to
aid in banking surveillance, prevent voter fraud, and in increased security efforts in airports. Biometric technology has traditionally been more
accepted overseas, with greater use in International Airports. 74 By Au75
gust 2001, Visionics reported doing business with almost sixty nations.
While the company has agreed to implement its technology in China to
aid in security of the nation's banking industry, the company has denied
68. Tightest Security Ever for Games, The Advertiser (South Australia) § Sports (Feb.
8, 2002).
69. David King, Security Becomes an Olympic Undertaking; Making Salt Lake City
Safe for Games is Taking $310 million, 15,000 People and an Array of High-Tech Gear, San
Antonio Express, News Al (Feb. 6, 2002).
70. Michael Beach, Troops Outnumber Athletes, Courier Mail, § News (Feb. 9, 2002).
71. Sean Kelly, The Best Defense: The Salt Lake Olympics Have More Money and Manpower Than Any Games, Denver Post D06 (Feb. 3, 2002).
72. Mark McNeil, Nexus Earns Games Berth; Face Recognition System Will Scan
Hockey Crowds, Protect Medals Vault, Hamilton Spectator (Ontario, Canada) C01 (Feb. 7,
2002). While many privacy advocates argued against the use of face recognition technology
at the Winter Games, Nexus Group International, the company which owns AcSys Biometric Corporation, argued that since its software does not retain the facial images it acquires
while scanning, that the method does not violate individual privacy. Id.
73. Hi, Mom, Say Hello to PresidentBush, St. Petersburg Times C19 (Feb. 10, 2002).
74. Erica Vonderheid, Biometrics Verify Travelers' Identity, 26 Institute
6 <http://
www.spectrum.ieee.org(INST/jan02/fbio.html> (last updated Jan. 2002). Tel Aviv's Ben
Gurion Airport has used a biometric technology since 1998 that scans palm prints which
compares the print to information stored on a passenger's "smart card." Id. In addition,
Amsterdam's Shiphol airport uses eye-scanning technology at its security checkpoints, also
comparing with an image taken from a passenger's photographic identification. Id.
75. NewsMax.com, Face-scan Technology Selling in China 4 <http://www.newsmax.
com/archives/articles/2001/8/9/73000.shtml> (last updated Aug. 9, 2001).
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sales to certain nations such as Iraq, Iran, and Libya. 7 6 In an implementation similar to Ybor City, Visionics contends that the use of face recognition technology in the Newham Borough of London has led to a forty
percent reduction in crime. 7 7 Keflavik International Airport in Iceland
78
was the first airport to actually use the technology.
One unique foreign use of face recognition technology has been to
prevent voter fraud. In the July 2000 Mexican presidential elections,
MetaData, a Mexico City-based Visionics' partner, expanded the FaceIT
software to help eliminate duplicate voter registrations. 79 In a similar
use, Viisage implemented its technology during the recent national election in the Republic of Uganda.8 0 The system used a database containing almost ten million images. 8 '
III.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TECHNOLOGY ENHANCES
GOVERNMENT METHODS

While there is no state or federal case law that addresses the constitutionality of face recognition technology, a court would have to focus on
whether it constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. The
Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but on probable cause." 8 2 In Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan, in his
concurring opinion, outlined the two essential inquiries in whether a person has a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy under the
76. Id. at 1 4, 6
77. Visionics Corp., Understanding Biometrics: Privacy Protection Principles
2
<http://www.visionics.com/newsroom/biometrics/privacy.html> (accessed Mar. 31, 2002).
78. David George, Airport Security Aiming for New Technologies 2 <http://www.cnn.
com/20011US/10/01/rec.airport.security/> (Oct. 1, 2001).
79. BioPrivacy.Org, Mexico Adopts Visionics' FaceIT Technology in PermanentSystem
for Eliminating Duplicate Voter Registrations
2-3 <http://www.bioprivacy.orgMexico.htm> (Apr. 23, 2001).
80. Matthew French, Recognition Technology Adds Security
2 <http://www.mass
hightech.comlas-mazzu.asp> (Mar. 8, 2002).
81. Id.; Julia Scheeres, Ploy Intimidates Uganda Voters 2 <http://www.wired.comI
news/print/0,1294,42070,00.html> (Feb. 27, 2001). However, law professor Winston Nagan
at the University of Florida, cautioned that the methods used by Viisage, namely the taking of digital photographs before voters entered polling booths, could have lead to intimidation of Ugandans, and thus reduce voter turnout. Id.; David McGuire, Urgandan Voter
Biometrics Could Violate Privacy 6 <http://www.infowar.com/classL/01/classl_030501a_
j.shtml> (Mar. 2, 2001). Furthermore, privacy advocates at the Center for Democracy and
Technology assert that the secret ballot is a key element to democratic elections, and that
the use of face recognition technology puts this element of the voting process in jeopardy.
Id.
82. U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
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Fourth Amendment.8 3 First, courts look to whether an individual has
manifested a "subjective expectation of privacy" in the object of the challenged search.8 4 Second, courts evaluate whether society is willing to
85
recognize that expectation as "reasonable."
In assessing whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of
privacy, the Supreme Court has consistently asserted that purely visual
inspections are less intrusive, and thus less likely to constitute a search,
compared to more tactile or physical invasions.8 6 For example, the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio has asserted that a careful frisk of the
outer surfaces of a person's clothing constitutes a "serious intrusion upon
the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment and is not to be undertaken lightly."8 7 On the other
hand, just one year after Katz the Supreme Court asserted in Harris v.
United States that "it has long been settled that objects falling in the
plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have
88
that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."
A.

SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY WITH VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

When looking at whether an individual has demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy not to be recorded in video surveillance, courts
look to whether that individual's conduct shows that he or she seeks to
preserve such activities as private.8 9 Under this inquiry, the court must
assess the person's state of mind in assessing whether their actions
showed such subjective expectation. 90 While the Supreme Court has not
developed a specific checklist to assess whether a person shows a subjective expectation, it has addressed the question employing diverse factors
such as the use to which an individual has put a location, and society's
understanding that certain areas deserve a heightened protection from
government intrusions. 9 1 When recently assessing whether an individual had a subjective expectation regarding luggage aboard a bus, the Supreme Court focused on the individual's use of an opaque bag to conceal
materials he was traveling with, in asserting the individual had demon83. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
84. Id.; see Cal. v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)
85. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735, 740
(1979).
86. Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334, 369 (2000).
87. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968).
88. Harris v. U.S., 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
89. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (asserting that individuals could not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial when using a telephone, since all telephone
users must realize that they must convey such numbers to the telephone company in order
to complete a call).
90. Vega-Rodriquez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir. 1997).
91. Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
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92
strated a subjective expectation.

1. Subjective Expectations In Thermal Imaging Technology
While somewhat distant from the implications of face recognition
technology, the thermal imaging technology used by police to detect the
indoor growth of marijuana has provided some helpful insight in how
courts could assess whether an individual has a subjective expectation of
privacy. Two federal circuit courts have employed somewhat contrasting
inquiries whether an individual has taken sufficient steps to conceal in93
door marijuana growth.
Under the Waste Heat' analysis employed by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, inquiries are made into whether the individual made
any attempt to conceal, or show concern for the resulting heat emissions
from the lamps used to grow marijuana indoors. 9 4 In contrast, the 'balance of the evidence' approach conducted by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, is a broader inquiry and balances an individual's total actions
95
against the excess heat emitted.
Under the Fifth Circuit's 'balance of the evidence' inquiry, the total
conduct of an individual is assessed in determining whether they have
demonstrated a subject expectation of privacy. 9 6 In Ishmael, thermal
imaging disclosed a structure used to grow marijuana on defendant's rural property. 9 7 While great care was taken to conceal its construction,
both thermal imaging and utility records showed the building produced a
lot of heat. 9 8 A later search uncovered 770 marijuana plants. 99 The trial
court granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence, holding the thermal scan infringed upon his subjective expectation of privacy. 10 0
The Fifth Circuit addressed how to assess whether someone exhibits
a subjective expectation of privacy. 1° 1 The court asserted that people do
10 2
not have to take every precaution to exhibit such an expectation.
Thus, the court used a 'balance of the evidence' approach, which measures whether a sufficient attempt is made to conceal indoor marijuana
growth. 10 3 In applying the test, the court asserted that defendant made
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Bond, 529 U.S. at 1465.
Robinson v. U.S., 62 F.3d 1325, 1328 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1329.
U.S. v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 851-52.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 853.
Id. at 854.
Id.
Id.
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a reasonable attempt to conceal the building's construction and chose to
build in a rural locale.1 0 4 Such conduct outweighed defendant's inability
held that defendant exto reduce the heat emissions.' 0 5 Thus, the court
06
hibited a subjective expectation of privacy.'
In comparison with the Fifth Circuit's method of assessing whether
an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy, the Eleventh Circuit inquires in whether affirmative steps are made to conceal heat emissions coming from indoor marijuana growth.' 0 7 In Robinson, the police
use of a thermal imaging device showed a large heat signature coming
from defendant's home.' 08 Utility records revealed above average energy use, and defendant had recently bought sodium lamps and hydroponic equipment. 10 9 A search showed a major indoor marijuana growing
operation. 110 At trial, defendant moved to suppress the seized marijuana, arguing that thermal imaging was illegal."' The issue before the
Eleventh Circuit was whether defendant had exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy.11 2 The court dismissed the 'balance of the evidence'
approach employed by the Fifth Circuit, and instead applied a 'Waste
heat' analysis. 1 3 Under this inquiry, the court determines whether the
defendant attempted to reduce heat emission or demonstrate a concern
for it. 11 4 Here, the court noted that Defendant failed to take any affirmative steps to prevent or reduce the resulting heat, which showed a general lack of concern. 115 Thus, in affirming the district court, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant did not exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy.116
Therefore, both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits employ somewhat
different inquiries when assessing whether an individual has taken sufficient steps to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy.117 While
the 'waste heat' analysis looks specifically on whether affirmative steps
are taken to conceal heat emissions, the 'balance of the evidence' approach looks broadly at the total actions made in concealing indoor mari104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1329.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1328.
Id.
Id. at 1329 n.4.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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118
juana cultivation.

2.

Subjective Expectations in Video Surveillance

When looking at what activities demonstrate such expectation with
the potential for police naked-eye surveillance, the use of a ten-foot fence
to shield an individual's domestic agricultural interests has been deemed
sufficient. 119 When assessing the constitutionality of silent video surveillance, courts are extremely cautious in assessing how such surveillance took place, and the nature of the government intrusion. 120 In
looking at hidden video surveillance, some courts have looked towards
specific activities like the closing of doors, the drawing of blinds, and the
exercising of control over a private hotel room, in finding that an individual showed a subjective expectation of privacy. 12 1 In addition, court outcomes are particularly fact driven, and outcomes often vary as to the
specific fact pattern. 12 2 Courts have measured the methods and duration of the video surveillance and the individual steps taken to protect
23
his or her privacy.1
In assessing whether an individual demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy towards video surveillance, courts look to whether the
individual voluntarily exposes his or her activities to the public. 124 In
Bailey, the defendant had moved to suppress evidence involving a video
tape recording of a storage locker that appeared to show the defendant
repackaging marijuana. 125 Defendant had rented the locker unit in a
self-storage commercial facility and was one of many people who had access to the facility. 126 While defendant had sole access to the individual
locker, the facility was not locked, and was open to members of the general public. 127 In addition, defendant had failed to close the door of the
128
locker facility when conducting the alleged activities.
The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court of Delaware centered
on whether the nature of defendant's choice of facility demonstrated a
subjective expectation of privacy.129 In looking at the nature of the facil118. See id.
119. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.
120. Thomas v. Johnson Co. Community College, 108 F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. Kan); U.S. v.
Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th Cir. 1990).
121. U.S. v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2000) (asserting that the use of a hidden
surveillance camera in a hotel room violated defendants subjective expectation of privacy).
122. Vega-Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 179-180.
123. Del. v. Bailey, 2001 WL 1739445, *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2001).
124. Id.
125. Id. at *1.
126. Id. at * 3.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *2.
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ity, the court found that while the commercial storage facility was not
exactly public, the defendant did know that it was not private. 130 Furthermore, the facility was full of similar lockers, and defendant's actions
could not have shown a subjective expectation of privacy, since the defendant could not have known whether the facility owners had placed monitoring equipment in the area, or when other fellow renters or staff could
have personally viewed defendant's actions. 13 1 However, the court drew
specific attention to the fact that defendant voluntarily exposed himself
to the surveillance, since defendant failed to close the locker door before
engaging in the alleged activities, and thus chose to show the locker's
contents to the public. 13 2 Thus, the court denied defendant's motion to
13 3
suppress evidence.
B.

REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY WITH SENSORY

ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE

The Supreme Court has consistently asserted that matters open to
public observation are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.13 4 Furthermore, non-intrusive government methods that provide only limited
information do not infringe upon society's reasonable expectations of privacy.13 5 While naked-eye observations from vantage points freely accessible to the public do not constitute a search, the use of vision enhancing
technology that reveals 'intimate details' does require a warrant under
13 6
the Fourth Amendment.
1.

Naked-Eye Aerial Surveillance

Government use of aerial naked-eye observations do not infringe
upon society's expectation of privacy, as long as they are not constant. 137
In California v. Ciraolo, Santa Clara police secured a private airplane
and few it over the respondent's home at an altitude of 1,000 feet within
navigable airspace. 138 From this overhead vantage point, officers
trained in marijuana identification easily observed marijuana plants
growing in the yard, which they photographed with a standard 35mm
130. Id. at *3.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *4.
134. Bond, 529 U.S. at 337; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211; Fla. v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450
(1989).
135. U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that a 'canine sniff of defendant's
luggage revealing narcotics failed to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment
since the method failed to expose luggage contents and afforded only limited information).
136. Dow Chem. Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
137. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.
138. Id. at 209.
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camera. 13 9 On appeal before the Supreme Court, the issue was whether
the use of aerial photography violated society's reasonable expectation of
140
privacy.
In looking at whether aerial observations infringe upon both personal and social values, the Court noted that the Fourth amendment protects the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's
home. 14 1 However, any observation from a public vantage point, where a
police officer has the right to be, which activities are clearly visible, does
not offend the Fourth Amendment.' 42 Thus, because any individual flying in public airspace could observe the respondent's marijuana activities, the Court concluded that the police actions failed to offend society's
43
reasonable expectation of privacy.'
2.

Vision Enhanced Aerial Surveillance

In addition to naked-eye aerial observations, vision-enhancing technology that does not reveal 'intimate details' also fails to violate society's
reasonable expectation of privacy. 14 4 In Dow Chemical, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") used an aerial photographer to take
precision photographs of petitioner's plant. 14 5 The district court held the
photographs infringed on petitioner's reasonable expectation of privacy. 146 However, the Sixth Circuit reversed, asserting such government methods were similar to naked-eye observations, and thus did not
require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. 14 7 The issue before
the Supreme Court was whether the government use of vision enhancing
surveillance technology offends society's reasonable expectation of
privacy. 148
In recognizing that naked-eye observations do not require a warrant, the Court extended this reasoning to include technology that does
not penetrate walls or windows. 149 The Supreme Court noted that under
the Fourth Amendment that the owner of commercial property enjoys a
139. Id.
140. Id. at 211.
141. Id. at 213.
142. Id. at 217.
143. Id. at 214-15.
144. Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238 (1986).
145. Id. at 229. The "EPA employed a commercial aerial photographer, using a standard floor-mounted precision aerial mapping camera, to take photographs of [Dow Chemical's 2,000-acre facility in Midland Michigan]." Id. While the photographs were taken
"from altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet," the EPA aircraft took the photographs
within navigable airspace. Id.
146. Id. at 231.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 235.
149. Id. at 239.
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diminished expectation of privacy, compared to the expectation of a
homeowner.1 50 While the government conceded that the use of highly
sophisticated surveillance techniques, not available to the public, could
require a warrant, the court reasoned that the use of map-making photography failed to reveal 'intimate details' of Dow's plant.15 1 Thus, government use of vision enhancing technology was acceptable under the
Fourth Amendment, as long as it did not reveal specific information of
activities within private property.' 52 Thus, the Court held that the
EPA's use of vision enhancing photography did not violate society's reai5 3
sonable expectation of privacy.
3.

Secret Video Surveillance

While individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy to be
free from occasional 'snooping' like aerial observations, courts have asserted that society deems constant video surveillance of an individual's
home as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' 5 4 When assessing whether video surveillance offends society's reasonable expectation
of privacy, the extent of that expectation often turns on the nature of the
intended governmental intrusion.' 55 The Ninth Circuit has asserted
that individuals do have an expectation of privacy against being videotaped in certain instances.' 56 Specifically, people may create temporary
zones of privacy within which they may not be videotaped, even when the
zone is a locale they do not own or control.' 57 Often, because images of
an 'Orwellian state' are invoked with the use of hidden video surveillance, courts require the government provide a showing of necessity in
58
order to justify its use.'
Individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy to be free of
secret hidden video surveillance, even when the observation was brief in
nature.' 59 In United States v. Nerber, the defendants entered a La
Quinta Inn in Seattle to conduct a narcotics transaction with FBI informants.' 60 The FBI and local authorities had rented the room, installed
hidden video cameras without first obtaining a warrant, and recorded
the transactions with defendants.' 6 ' At trial, the defendants moved to
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 251.
U.S. v. Teketa, 923 F.2d 665, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 677.
U.S. v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1984).
Nerber, 222 F.3d. at 600.
Id. at 599.
Id.
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suppress the evidence obtained from the video surveillance, which was
granted. 16 2 On appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the issue centered on
whether such surveillance was reasonable under the Fourth
163
Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit noted that the idea of a brief commercial transaction taking place in a short amount of time with lack of any previous
connection between parties makes the issue of reasonableness a very
close call. 16 4 In assessing society's expectation of privacy, the court assessed the government's intrusion in implementing hidden video surveillance. 16 5 Unlike aerial surveillance that is a one-time observation, the
use of cameras are different since they allow all activities within view to
be constantly recorded.16 6 However, in looking at the nature of the government's intrusion, the Ninth circuit agreed with the district court that
defendants failed to have an expectation of privacy which society would
16 7
deem as reasonable.
Defendant's expectation of privacy was greatly diminished because
they were not 'residents' of the hotel where the transactions took place,
nor were they overnight guests of the hotel. 1 68 While defendants had an
objective expectation of privacy when alone in a hotel room, such expectation was reduced when the activity was for the limited purpose of conducting a commercial transaction. 16 9 Thus, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
70
district courts denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence.'
IV.

APPLYING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES TO FACE
RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY

Because no federal or state court has directly analyze the constitutionality of face recognition technology, a court would likely have to assess the Fourth Amendment implications of such a government method
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 600. The Nerber court focused on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Minn. v.
Carter, in assessing reasonableness. Id. In Carter, defendants had entered a person's
apartment for a brief period to conduct a narcotics transaction. Minn. v. Carter,525 U.S.
83, 85 (1998). A police officer was able to peer through the window of a ground floor apartment, though a gap in the blinds, to observe the placement of white powder in bags. Id.
The Supreme Court asserted that due to the purely commercial nature of the transaction,
the short period of time on the premise, and the lack of connection with the parties, the
officer's visual observations failed to violate society's reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
at 91.
165. Nerber, 222 F.3d at 602.
166. Id.; Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 251.
167. Nerber, 222 F.3d at 604.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 605.
170. Id. at 606.
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under the Katz v. United States reasoning. 17 1 First, a court would look
at whether an individual's specific actions when being viewed and identified with face recognition technology demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy.1 7 2 Second, the court would have to assess whether
society regards identification through such methods as being reasonable. 173 In assessing facial recognition technology under this framework,
a court would look at the intrusive nature of such a search; whether the
search fit more like a frisk or body search found in Terry v. Ohio, 174 or
whether it would be more like a non-physical 'canine sniff as decided in
75
United States v. Place.1
A.

DEMONSTRATING A SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN FACE
RECOGNITION IDENTIFICATION

While it would be difficult for an individual to show a subjective expectation of privacy in his or her face, an individual's conduct could show
some steps to help preserve their facial features and activities as private. 176 Just as courts have looked to specific factors in assessing such a
subjective expectation, courts could look at each unique use of facial recognition technology, like in the context of a check-in at an airport, or at a
public venue like the entertainment district of Ybor City, to assess the
different nature of the use, and whether such a use would deserve
heightened protection from the government intrusion.
1.

Possible Factorsof a Total Conduct Test

One possible approach would be to apply the Fifth Circuit's 'total
conduct' test used in Ishmael v. United States in the face recognition context.17 7 Certainly, individuals must often enter public venues such as
shopping areas, or grocery stores, in order to purchase and maintain
their daily needs. Thus, it would almost be impossible for an individual
to avoid public venues, in order to reduce the chance that their facial
profile could be extracted and used for identification with face recognition technology. The Fifth Circuit was clear that when assessing
whether an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy, an individ171. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J. concurring).
172. Id. at 361.
173. Id.
174. 392 U.S. at 17-18 (holding that due to the intrusive character and physical nature
of a body search over an individual's clothing, that such a frisk constituted a search under
the Fourth Amendment).
175. 462 U.S. at 707 (asserting that the use of a dog sniff to detect narcotics in concealed
luggage failed to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment due to the non-intrusive
nature of the search).
176. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
177. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854.
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ual does not have to take every precaution in order to exhibit such an
expectation.' 7 8 Thus, when an individual has made any sufficient attempt to conceal their facial features, or attempted to avoid identification
from facial recognition technology, such actions could be sufficient to
1 79
show an expectation of privacy.
Celebrities and well-known music performers have often been
known to wear wigs or don large sunglasses, in order to conceal their
identities from the public. Certain religions and ethnic traditions require the use of certain headdresses, as recently seen by the numerous
television reports on the traditional wearing of the burka by Afgan women. Thus, under the 'total conduct' test outlined by the Fifth Circuit,
an individual donning some method of concealing their distinct facial
identity to ward against identification using facial recognition technology could warrant a finding that that person has demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy.' 8 0
2.

Possible Inquiry under an 'Affirmative Steps' Test

A second approach, slightly different from the Ishmael inquiry,
would be to assess under Eleventh Circuit reasoning whether an individual's action of going out in public constitutes an 'affirmative step' sufficient to destroy any subjective expectation of privacy in his or her facial
features. l 8 ' Under this more narrow inquiry, a court would look at
whether an individual sought to prevent detection under face recognition
surveillance, or if such an individual showed a general concern for such
surveillance. 1 82 Any activity in which an individual would avail himself
or herself to face recognition technology, like entering a public sporting
venue to attend a professional football game, could constitute 'affirmative steps' to reduce their subjective expectation of privacy.' 8 3 However,
several actions could be performed by an individual to show concern for
the possibility of being identified at such a sporting event. 184 Apart from
an individual donning the traditional 'dog pound' paraphernalia worn by
Cleveland Browns fans, an individual could refrain from certain public
locations within the stadium like the beer stand. 1 85 Again, just as in the
total conduct analysis, the wearing of certain items to alter their identity
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1329.
182. Id.
183. See id. (describing application of the "affirmative step" test to the factual scenario).
184. See id. (analyzing how an individual's actions can establish a subjective concern for
privacy).
185. Id.; see Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854 (outlining how to assess an individual's demonstration of a subjective expectation of privacy).
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would help support a finding that an individual evidenced a subjective
186
expectation under the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning.
Thus, under the inquiry, wearing items like hats or glasses could
mitigate against an individual's need to go into a public place where face
18 7
recognition technology was used.
B.

EXAMPLE OF TAMPA SUPER BOWL

A surveillance technique that is not generally known or understood
often creates a situation where individuals could not have a subjective
expectation of privacy.1 8 8 Both the ACLU and the Tampa area press
were quick to point out that spectators at the 2001 Super Bowl were not
aware, and were not told, that facial recognition technology was going to
be used to scan the crowd to identify potential terrorists and wanted
criminals. 189 Again, the central inquiry in assessing a subjective expectation of privacy is the person's state of mind. 190 The Tampa Super Bowl
is a clear example of a situation where spectators could not have possibly
demonstrated the requisite actions in order to manifest a subjective expectation of privacy, because they completely lacked the knowledge of
the actual use of facial recognition technology.' 9 ' However, when the
use of facial recognition technology at a location is well known and documented, 19 2 such as the use at Tampa's Ybor City entertainment district,
such implementation would afford a more difficult inquiry. 19 3 While the
2001 Super Bowl became one of the first well known uses of facial recognition technology, and although the technology has been pervasive in the
media after the tragedy of September 1 1 th, courts will have to look at
whether the public was properly notified as to the use of the
technology.194
186. Id.
187. See id. (applying the court's reasoning in its assessment of a subject's conduct when
evaluating demonstration of a subjective expectation of privacy).
188. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (describing how the public's understanding of telephone
technology impacts one's ability to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy); see
also Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854 (outlining the implications of thermal imaging techniques
upon an individual's subjective expectation of privacy).
189. Carey, supra n. 42, at 2.
190. See Vega-Rodriquez, 110 F.3d at 178 (describing the analysis of one's state of mind
and its impact upon subjective expectation of privacy).
191. See id.
192. Tampa Puts Face-Recognition,supra n. 23.
193. See Vega, 110 F.3d at 178 (discussing the state of mind of the subject as relevant to
an assessment of the subjective expectation of privacy); see Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (reviewing analysis of the subjective expectation of privacy).
194. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
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ASSESSING WHETHER FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY IS A

GOVERNMENT METHOD SOCIETY DEEMS AS REASONABLE

When assessing whether a method of government surveillance constitutes a search, the Supreme Court of the United States has asserted
that matters open to the public are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 195 Certainly, many of the actions associated with identification
through facial recognition technology would be considered as matters
open to the public, in that they occur within larger public venues such as
airports, sporting events and entertainment districts. In addition, like
other non-intrusive government methods like the canine sniffs used to
detect drugs in airport luggage, facial recognition technology only intrudes upon the outward facial features that are exposed to the public. 19 6 The documented uses of facial recognition technology have all
been conducted from vantage points that are freely accessible to the public. 19 7 While under these traditional inquiries into whether the government method would not infringe upon society's reasonable expectation
appears to favor extending such principles to facial recognition technology, both the 'intimate details' analysis 1 98 and case law directly addressing video surveillance1 9 9 could complicate the inquiry.
1.

Reasonableness Under the 'Intimate Details'Analysis

The use of vision-enhancing technology that reveals 'intimate details' is not a government method which society would deem as reasonable. 20 0 In addressing whether the use of map-making aerial technology
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, the Dow Chemical
court was particularly careful in pointing out that the use of highly sophisticated surveillance techniques, not available to the public, could potentially be deemed as unreasonable. 20 1 Certainly, the actual taking of
an individuals photographic likeness failed to constitute an 'intimate detail' under the Dow Chemical reasoning, since such an image could be
20 2
viewed through naked-eye observations without the aid of technology.
However, the type of information obtained via facial-recognition
technology could be deemed as 'intimate details.' 20 3 With face-recognition technology, the software could potentially record both the time and
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Bond, 529 U.S. at 336; see Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.
Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.
Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 239.
Nerber, 222 F.3d. at 600.
Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 239.
See id. at 238.
Id. at 239.
Id.
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location a particular person was identified. 20 4 For example, software
could record that a person was located entering the Ybor City entertainment district at 9:05 p.m., who then entered a specific restaurant at 9:45
p.m., and then dined with another identified person starting at 10:00
p.m. Thus, while the actual extraction of that individuals' face in a public place would constitute a naked-eye observation, the total information
obtained with the technology mirrors the 'Orwellian society' commentators fear with face recognition systems.
In addition to the specific details obtained from entering a single
area that employed the facial recognition technology, if systems were
networked, they could create more sweeping arrays of 'intimate details.' 20 5 In expanding on the example provided above, a networked system could identify an individual in one location on a specific date, and
identify that same person at a different location afterwards. A person
recorded as entering Ybor City three days ago, could then be recorded at
a Las Vegas gambling casino today, and then recorded as taking a flight
to New York tomorrow. Certainly, a networked system recording could
easily record these instances of identification to provide an accurate view
of that person's public activities.
Both of these examples illustrate the potential of how face recognition technology could impact society and how such use when placed in
20 6
this context probes into the 'intimate details' of an individual's life.
Further, these examples illustrate exactly what the Supreme Court
feared, that advancing technology could create the potential for a method
that is clearly unreasonable, and would require a warrant under the
Fourth Amendment. 20 7 The single use of face recognition technology to
scan a public venue to identify a potential terrorist or wanted criminal,
may not actually arise to the level of 'Orwellian' proportions. However,
as illustrated, the method does have this potential.
2.

Reasonableness Under Video Surveillance Reasoning

Unlike aerial surveillance, which only allows one-time observations,
the proposed implementation of face recognition technology in public venues like airports would allow activities within such facilities to be constantly recorded. 20 8 Just like with video surveillance, courts could
assert that in facilities that use face recognition identification of employees or visitors, such individuals should be afforded certain zones of pri204. Jane Black, FaceIT, Face-Cams are Here to Stay
3 <http://businessweek.com/
bwdaily/dnflash/nov2001/nf20011115_3919.htm> (accessed Apr. 22, 2002).
205. Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 239.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 251.
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vacy. 209 Thus, a court in assessing the reasonableness of facial
recognition technology would have to compare such methods along the
same lines as video surveillance and assess the nature of the government
2 10
intrusion.
As provided by the Nerber reasoning, courts in assessing whether
video surveillance constitutes an unreasonable intrusion should look to
where the activities take place and the purpose of the individual's conduct. 2 11 In areas where individuals go for the limited purpose of conducing commercial transactions, courts view the hidden video
surveillance of such activities as having a heightened level of intrusiveness. 212 Certainly the areas where face recognition technology could potentially be implemented, such as airports and entertainment centers,
are locations were individuals go simply for a short period of time in order to conduct a consumer transaction. 2 13 Thus, unlike a home, which is
afforded the highest level of Fourth Amendment protection, a court in
assessing the intrusiveness of such public surveillance could potentially
2 14
view it as unreasonable.
Lastly, the potential exists that, in time, society could regard the use
of face recognition technology as reasonable. Just as society over the last
twenty years has simply become use to the idea of being the object of
video surveillance at shopping malls, convenience stores, and banks, society could get use to similar observation implementing face recognition
technology. 2 15 Society's views and norms have always changed and
adapted over time, and society could quickly acquiesce to the use of this
technology. In addition, with society's fears of potential terrorist takeover of domestic commercial flights after September 1 1 th , society could
immediately view face recognition technology as an acceptable privacy
invasion. Thus, like with certain types of video surveillance, face recognition technology could be deemed today as an invasion which society
deems as reasonable, and thus not a search under the Fourth
Amendment.
V.

CONCLUSION

After the tragic events of September 1 1 th, and the need for added
security in our nation's airports and public venues, face recognition technology will continue to be researched, advanced, and implemented. Al209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Teketa, 923 F.2d at 677.
Id.
Nerber, 222 F.3d at 603.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Burrows, supra n. 10, at 1079.
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though the use of this technology has not been sufficiently proven in
venues like Tampa's Ybor City and the hockey arena of the Salt Lake
City Winter Olympics, 2 16 corporations like Visionics and Viisage persist
on developing and implementing these systems. 2 17 While these systems
may not accurately or effectively identify potential terrorists or criminals
at our nation's airports, they still may have the potential to deter such
individuals from entertaining ideas of hijacking a commercial aircraft.
However, the fact remains that no face recognition system has ever led to
2 18
the actual identification and arrest of a criminal or terrorist.
The constitutional issues of facial recognition technology remain unresolved. However, if and when the constitutionality of such a system is
brought to court, both Katz inquiries would have to be addressed in assessing if the technology constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 2 19 As a fact intensive inquiry, it is possible that an individual
could demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy. 2 20 Certainly, an
individual's affirmative steps to conceal their identity, such as wearing a
hat or sunglasses, could be sufficient to demonstrate such an expectation. 2 2 1 Furthermore, individuals by simply going to a public facility like
a grocery store or shopping mall, have not necessarily shown sufficient
steps to be deemed to have a lower expectation or privacy. 2 22 Rather,
courts would have to assess an individual's total conduct in assessing
whether his or her state of mind demonstrated a sufficient expectation of
privacy. 2 23 However, the more fundamental question becomes whether
people will begin to alter how they look when entering facilities that use
face recognition technology.
In addition, whether society would deem the use of this technology
as reasonable may depend upon how it is implemented, as well as what
society's willingness to accept privacy reducing methods following September 1 1 th.224 Certainly, the immediate public reaction following the
tragic events in New York and Washington was to implement any technology in domestic airports to alleviate long lines, and to identify any
individuals with known ties to terrorist groups. 2 25 Thus, society may
already regard face recognition technology as a reasonable expectation of
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privacy. However, only time will tell if society's perspective will revert to
a more privacy wary mentality.
Apart from society's perspective in light of September 1 1th, certain
aspects of face recognition technology could provide the level of 'intimate
details' to be far too intrusive to constitute a reasonable expectation of
privacy. The potential for the technology to allow the government to
know the day-to-day activities of public citizens does create the potential
for an "Orwellian" state. 2 26 While the public has become acclimated to
regular video surveillance at public venues like banks, grocery stores,
and shopping malls, society would not tolerate the ability of the government to obtain such detailed and specific information. 2 27 Under this
context, such a method should be deemed as overly intrusive, and thus a
search under the Fourth Amendment.
It should be noted that while facial recognition has not been effectively implemented and while the aforementioned reasoning appears to
cast a dark shadow on whether such a system violates an individual's
legitimate expectation of privacy, the technology does have the potential
to be something which is both useful and needed in this country. Face
recognition technology does have the potential to ease the fears of airline
travelers, and help reduce the chance for a repeat performance of September 1 1 th.228 Similar biometric technologies implemented overseas in
international airports demonstrate a real need to implement similar precautions in domestic airports as an increased security measure to avoid
future terrorists plots. 2 29 Thus, the potential for such systems to accurately identify individuals could increase the value of such methods, and
therefore help balance against their privacy implications.
Therefore, only through the continued evaluation and criticism of
face recognition technology by privacy advocates and other commentators will there be assurances that the method will not offend the policies
underlying the Fourth Amendment. With no case law and no federal legislation in place, peripheral technologies like video surveillance and
thermal imaging will allow constructs to evaluate the constitutionality of
face recognition technology.
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